US covert action

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programs and policies abroad that are not apparent or acknowledged publicly. Whether it is a realistic expectation for U.S. to continue with covert action? There is no realistic expectation that U.S. can continue with covert actions without been discovered. Covert action remains a third option for American foreign policy beyond the initial two options of diplomacy and combat. On covert action, the CIA can be regarded as damned when they do, and damned when they do not. Can one expect the U.S. hand to remain hidden even if the action is discovered? Covert actions details activities of the U.S. government to influence political, military, or economic conditions abroad. The U.S. government conceals its responsibility based on the justification that the U.S. responsibility would render an operation infeasible. The core objective of covert action rests on influencing events overseas secretly and in support of U.S. foreign policy.2 The U.S. would be overly optimistic for its hand to remain hidden even if the action is discovered…. For instance, if Israel was to admit having a nuclear program, such an action can trigger a nuclear arms race within the Middle East, who may feel threatened by Israel. Plausible deniability or the non-attribution to the U.S. for its covert operations makes it impossible to trace back to their point of origin. Plausible deniability is pertinent in protecting the U.S., and it operatives’ from the consequences of disclosures. Measures to make covert action a continued viable policy? Covert action is a necessary, but controversial instrument for U.S. foreign policy. The government should undertake covert actions only if: the intentions and objectives are concisely spelled out, just, and reasonable. there is a reasonable possibility of success. the methods envisaged are commensurate with the objectives. and, due deliberation undertaken with the full knowledge and concurrence of appropriate constituents. Question 2: (A) What was the objective of each operation? The overthrow of Mossadeq in Iran (1953) arose when Kermit Roosevelt and few other CIA operatives orchestrated a successful coup against Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq the U.S perceived as becoming allied with Iran’s Soviet-dominated Tudeh Party. Roosevelt secured the hesitant support of the Shah dismissing Mossadeq. Zahedi, a highly ranking officer, selected to lead the coup.5 In the wake of the success of the Iranian operation, the CIA also orchestrated a combination of both military and psychological pressures to force leftist Guatemala president, Jacobo Arbenz from office in 1954. The operation (labeled as Operation BPSUCCESS) utilized an invasion by a ragtag liberation army, fictional arms drops, psychologically effective CIA air attacks, and disinformation disseminated to prompt