Evaluation of CEO [Supervisor’s Evaluation of CEO The paper attempts to discuss the five points by Carver that a board should not do during the evaluation of CEO and setting the argument in the context of self inspection and direct inspection monitoring. Carver states that evaluating the CEO performance or by selecting a CEO for its appointment, the board must avoid asking the opinions of customers or customer’s survey. The organization can take a survey regarding the satisfaction of a product or a service but this situation is critical to the future of the company. Customers are unaware of the performance and activities of the CEO which would make it difficult for them to evaluate and would often bring surprises. Carver forces not to use 360 degree evaluation of a CEO because it violates the good governance when it is applied to a CEO. The CEO must be evaluated with unknown criteria. The board should not confront a CEO in front of all the board members which most often does not work. Each individual board member should separately evaluate the CEO with full authority (Carver amp. Carver, 2009). The ad hoc members should not observe or experience the evaluation of a CEO because these are the special groups which are outsourced and are not part of an organization. In that case the assessment would not be accurate and there are chances that the assessment process would not according to company’s criteria. Lastly, the Board should not assign the task to the ‘special committee’ or the Chairman for the assessment of the CEO because unconsciously, the CEO would then work for whoever appointed him to handle the company’s matters. The board itself would be responsible for the evaluation of CEO (Carver amp. Carver, 2009). The points listed by Carver for the CEO evaluation has to be agreed because these points can either help a company in the appointment of a good CEO or it can make it worse for the company. The board should be able to adopt the concept of self inspection monitoring in which the company relates its own standards for evaluating the CEO with the general standard in other firms. This helps the company in mitigating the risks involved with their own CEO evaluation and in the end it can propose points related to the company’s own process related to the CEO evaluation. There is an agreement how Carver proposed those points which should be avoided in the case of a CEO in forming the special committee or hiring the outside professionals to deal with the case. There is a possibility that the CEO might perform the work that pleases the committee who appointed him as the CEO. There should not be favoritism involved in its selection because that would negatively favor the company’s overall performance (Carver amp. Carver, 2009). Direct inspection monitoring allows the company to set their own guidelines for evaluating CEO irrespective of the standards that are commonly applied in companies. The company would then face difficulties because it would not help them to compare it with the standard procedure. The board should itself appoint the CEO with their methods which should be in relation with the general standards set by other top rated firms (Carver amp. Carver, 2009). Reference ListCarver, J., amp. Carver, M. (2009). A Carver Policy Governance Guide, Evaluating CEO and Board Performance. San Francisco: John Wiley amp. Sons.Carver, J., amp. Carver, M. (2009). A Carver Policy Governance Guide, The Policy Governance Model and the Role of the Board Members. San Francisco: John Wiley amp. Sons.