According to the research findings, it can, therefore, be said that the plant was the property of Nypro UK, founded a few years before the explosion for the production of fertilizer from the waste of steelwork factory near the area. After a certain period, they switched to producing caprolactam, a biochemical that facilitates the manufacture of nylon. In mid-1972, the management made changes on the procedure of making the chemical. Initially, the used the hydrogenation process but they switched to oxidizing the hot liquid chemical using compressed air. The reason for the alteration was to produce larger amounts of the biochemical yearly. definitely, this worked from the beginning and if it had continued to the end of the year, the amount of caprolactam produced could have been twice as much. Finding out a way to produce large amounts was the only way out for them to survive because the government controlled the pricing of the chemical in the country creating pressure. The disaster emanated from a critical outflow of liquid from the cauldron track causing the quick creation of a huge veil of hydrocarbon gas that is highly flammable. The hydrocarbon gas met a furnace causing a massive fuel-air explosion leading to a collapse of the main regulator room where eighteen workers died instantly. Their fire caused by the explosion killed another group of nine workers and the last person, a driver, died of a heart attack in his vehicle. The fire continued to burn down the infrastructure inside and outside the plant for a consecutive ten days and a radius of over three miles. Reconstruction of the plant took place a few years later after the explosion and they went back to producing the chemical through hydrogenation like before. This time around, the Health and Safety Executives intervened and oversaw the all the procedures in the plant including the working conditions of the employees and the potential risks.