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Epicureans Definition of Pleasure

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Hence, Epictetus points out that we possess the capacity to function well in this area knowing that it would not lead to disappointment if we choose to cultivate any of such concerns since these occur spontaneously apart from restraint or external force that is not part of our conscious act. Then because only things within our control are subject to the actions of our choice and we are always in harmony with the willed act, it follows thus that we can bring them to cultivation to become those things that make us live a life of virtue. Epictetus particularly exemplifies body, property, reputation, command as things falling beyond our control and are held in possession by other human beings. This being the case, as we attempt to execute around them, then, we are more likely to acquire frustration for what we cannot control is well within the bounds of abilities employed by others whose thoughts, attitude, and goals in life are necessarily different from ours. The power we hope to apply in this regard is fleeting or temporary for by nature, there would emerge struggles in trying to gain something that bears no certainty toward real success. For instance, we may not attach ourselves fully to a property owned because once it is stolen or given over to destruction at a moment we are less able to keep watch of it, the unfortunate incident is going to cause us inevitable pain from which we would rather cultivate malice or hatred toward suspected individuals. This is chiefly the reason virtuous living cannot possibly be sought after perishable objects that are out of reach of our full control since they are more concrete compared to the immaterial principles that form our identity and beliefs which others can never claim ownership of. What we can control appears to dwell in our inner sense of being so that cultivating it serves a firm grasp of wisdom, and therefore, of virtuosity. (2) What sorts of relationships should we form with other people? How is this related to the issue of externals and judgment? Through a Stoic point of view, we ought to establish relationships on the basis of duties that make us recognize the essence of accountability and obligation without having to neglect the nature we seek with freedom. When we relate to others, we must not expect state of affairs that would favor our welfare even if such relations were biological and we could suppose too ideally as to hope for returns that are more than just. Other people are entitled to their own actions and so are we and on this ground, Epictetus encourages us to consider or give thought not about the wicked deed done to us by another person, instead, on the action we should take in order that we can remain disposed to acknowledge the treatment provided by our faculties regarding the person’s response. We have to accept externals as they are in nature for in this manner, we maintain the norm of keeping things settled in place. Here, we may not accuse others of wrongdoing or injustice upon us for whatever they take does not really belong to us and it is in how we prefer to see and judge their deed that brings about misery as long as we consume our energy grieving over losses in life and property that are not our own originally though we admit to having experienced them with frequency. Between a parent and a child, for example as Epictetus notes,