From 2002 to 2007, there occurred yield compression, the capital values of real estate rose rapidly, and the availability of capital for investment in the real estate increased drastically. The rapid rise in property values was already losing momentum prior to the liquidity crisis of the summer of 2007, which in turn triggered a significant downturn in both the broader economy and the property market (pwc.co.uk, 2012, p. 4). The global financial crisis has severely tested the managers of unlisted real estate funds in a whole range of ways that include but are not limited to investor activity, liquidity management, vacation accuracy of indirect as well as direct holdings, availability of asset, pricing, debt management, investor communication, and unit pricing. All of this has happened in the context of the economic instability along with market commentary and increasingly subjective media. In spite of the fact that the global financial crisis has receded and the flow of money in the unlisted real estate funds has started to become normal, yet much needs to be done to resolve the process of selectivity by the investors. The movement of capital because of the cost of the withdrawal of the funds has inertia as an inherent feature. The under-performance of open-ended funds by a few investors has enabled them to withdraw funds and use the secondary market for selling interests. In some cases, the investors have made a joint effort to change the funds’ manager. The complete effect of the judgment of the investors upon the fund managers can take years to play out rather than a few months because the deployment of new capital is the decision of the investors. Fund managers who have not been able to satisfy their investors may find it difficult to raise new funds. Collection of the new funds makes the depiction of success and loss among the fund managers more apparent. Unlisted funds typically are structured as a private equity fund (Huibers, 2012, p. 5). Since the onset of the global financial crisis, there has occurred immense change in the landscape of real-estate private-equity in terms of drawing out of numerous financial institutions from the unlisted real-estate market and sale of platforms (Yue et al., 2010). During the global financial crisis, the investors were struck into funds which they could not find an escape from easily. After gaining this experience, many investors are looking for more flexibility in real estate investment. Cash-rich investors wanted to increase their equity in an attempt to keep the bank from seizing their portfolio in cases of breaches of loan-to-value. Fund managers realized that some investors were not able to match the investments. The interests became so divergent that it was hard to reconcile. As a result of this, many investors are nowadays looking for like-minded co-investors for partnership with them so as to be able to reach agreement easily in the times of conflict. This trend reduces the size of the investors’ clubs established to invest money in specific portfolios, properties, and redevelopment projects. There are also certain investors who are seeking funds to get them structured in such a way that increases the liquidity. Investor registers are also being made by the large pooled funds to improve communication among the investors. Debt and the way it was dealt with by the fund managers during the last boom and bust is an important issue.